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To the average person (perhaps even the average economist), unemployment is often
equated to a state of involuntary idleness. This commonly held view, however, is incon-
sistent with the way in which unemployment is actually deﬁned and measured. According
to International Labor Organization conventions (which are followed by most national
labor force surveys), unemployment constitutes those individuals who are not employed
but who are actively searching for work (over the reference period of the survey—e.g., the
previous four weeks). Nonemployed (jobless) individuals who not engaged in active job-
search are classiﬁed as nonparticipants. This latter category includes the set of so-called
‘discouraged workers.’
To the extent that active job-search consumes time and other resources, relating unem-
ployment to a state of idleness seems wrong. Furthermore, to the extent that individuals
are free to allocate their time across many competing activities, with time devoted to
search yielding at least the prospect of a future payoﬀ, the notion of unemployment as
an involuntary state is potentially misleading. To understand unemployment—or, at least,
unemployment data (as opposed to some other pet notion of unemployment)—one must
therefore entertain a theory that explains the circumstances under which individuals ﬁnd
it in their interest to remain nonemployed while searching for work. Search models of
unemployment are designed to do just this.
2S e a r c h T h e o r y
A hallmark of conventional labor market theory (the neoclassical model and its sticky-
wage variants) is the assumption that labor is exchanged in a centralized market place.
Among other things, a centralized market embodies the idea that there is perfect informa-
tion concerning the location of all jobs and workers. In any such environment, devoting
precious time to an activity like search literally makes no sense (whether or not the wage is
market-clearing). That is, individuals either have a worthwhile job opportunity to exploit
or they do not. In the former case, they become employed; in the latter, they become
nonemployed (and would be labeled as nonparticipants by standard labor force surveys).
The starting point for any search model of unemployment then is to dispense with
the notion of a centralized market place for labor. Instead, the labor market is viewed
as a set of decentralized locations, where ﬁrms and workers can potentially meet to form
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1mutually beneﬁcial relationships. In a decentralized market, meetings are to some extent
determined by search eﬀort and to some extent by chance. In many ways, the labor
market resembles a matching market for couples. That is, one is generally aware that
the opposite side of the market consists of better and worse matches (we seldom take the
view that there are no potential matches). The exact location of the better matches is
unknown, but may be discovered with some eﬀort. In the meantime, it may make sense
to refrain from matching with ‘substandard’ opportunities that are currently available.
But since search is costly, it will generally not be optimal to wait for one’s ‘soulmate’ to
come along. Furthermore, since relationships are not perfectly durable, there is no reason
to expect the stock of singles to converge to zero over time. Nor is it clear, given the
technology of match-formation, that having everyone matched at all times (irrespective of
m a t c hq u a l i t y )i si na n yw a yd e s i r a b l e — e v e ni fi ti sf e a s i b l e ;a n de v e ni fp e o p l eg e n e r a l l y
desire to be matched.
In the context of the labor market then, the key friction that potentially rationalizes
job-search (and hence, unemployment) is imperfect information over the location of one’s
best job opportunity. In such an environment, job search constitutes a form of investment
in the acquisition of information. The idea of job-search as an information-gathering
activity has been around for some time; see, for example, Stigler (1962) as well as the
several papers and references contained in Phelps (1970). Perhaps the most inﬂuential
early formalization of the theory of job-search is provided by McCall (1970); see also
Sargent (1987, Chapter 2). In the next section, I present the basic idea of this classic
literature by way of a simple model.
3 A Simple Model
I begin by describing a simple ‘one-sided’ search model; e.g., the case in which an indi-
vidual searches for a job opportunity that pays a given wage depending on match quality.
Each time period t =1 ,2,...,∞ is divided into two subperiods that I call stage 1 and stage
2. There will be no intertemporal aspect to individual decision-making, so the model’s
dynamic equilibrium can be thought of as a sequence of static equilibria.
Each person enters stage 1 endowed with one unit of (indivisible) time, a job oppor-
tunity that pays a real wage w ∈ [0,w], and a leisure opportunity that generates a return
0 <b<w. One can interpret b as either an unemployment insurance beneﬁto r ,m o r e
generally, as the consumption available when nonemployed (e.g., home production). The
real wage w can be interpreted as the quality of the job-worker match associated with
any given job opportunity. Assume that individuals do not know the precise location of
their best job match (i.e., the match that would yield them w ). However, individuals
are assumed to know the distribution of match-qualities associated with the given set of
available jobs; let F(w) denote the fraction of job matches that yield a wage no greater
than w. The act of job search is modeled as a random draw from F(w).
At the beginning of stage 1, must make a choice: should I search or not? The act of not
searching means that time must be allocated during stage 1 across one of two activities:
work or leisure. The utility payoﬀ to work is u(w), while the utility payoﬀ to leisure is
u(b), where u00 < 0 <u 0. Conditional on choosing not to search, optimal behavior entails
choosing to work iﬀ w ≥ b. Alternatively, I could choose to search instead. In this case,
my time endowment is ‘transported’ to stage 2. Here, the cost of job search is given by
the assumption of no recall; i.e., I must abandon my current opportunity w to exercise
my search option. Let w0 ∼ F(w0) denote the wage associated with a new job opportunity
2I ﬁnd as a result of my search. At this stage, I now have the opportunity to either work
or leisure; i.e., I will only choose to work at this new job if w0 ≥ b. Hence, the expected





Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that consumption levels during stage 1 and 2
are viewed as perfect substitutes. As well, I am assuming that consumption is nonstorable
and the absence of insurance/loan markets.
T h ep r o b l e mh a sb e e ns e tu ph e r ei ns u c haw a yt h a ti tw i l ln e v e rb eo p t i m a lf o ra
person to choose leisure during stage 1. This is because there is always a zero-cost option
to consume leisure during stage 2. Hence, the relevant choice during stage 1 is whether
to work or search. The optimal strategy is to set a reservation wage wR(b), such that one
should choose work if w ≥ wR(b) and choose search if w<w R(b). This reservation wage
must satisfy:
u(wR)=S(b). (1)
That is, a person’s reservation wage is deﬁned to be the wage that would make a
person just indiﬀerent between working at that wage, or abandoning it in favor of another
activity (in this case, job search). In other words, the reservation wage is a measure of
an individual’s ‘choosiness’ over job opportunities. Note that as S0(b)=F(b)u0(b) > 0,
the reservation wage is an increasing function of the option value associated with leisure.
Intuitively, a person with a good outside option (b) can aﬀord to be more discriminating
with respect to the quality of any given job opportunity w.
Thus far, I have described the choice problem of an individual beginning with an
endowed wage/leisure opportunity (w,b). I would like to now describe how this behavior
translates into the evolution of aggregates over time. To render static decision-making
optimal in this environment, assume that all individuals begin each period with a match
quality w drawn from the distribution G(w). The interpretation here is that economy
experiences a ‘structural’ shock every period that ‘shuﬄes’ individual match qualities, but
otherwise leaves aggregate production possibilities unchanged. Following this structural
shock, individuals behave in the manner described above. For simplicity, assume that all
individuals share a common value for b that remains constant over time.
It is a simple matter now to characterize the equilibrium unemployment rate. At the
beginning of each period, individuals are randomly assigned a match quality w,w h o s e
distribution is G(w). The fraction [1 − G(wR)] will choose to exploit their employment
opportunity and the fraction G(wR) will ﬁnd it optimal to abandon their opportunity in
favor of search. Job-searchers ﬁnd new job opportunites with associated match-qualities
w0 drawn from the distribution F(w0). Those who ﬁnd a job that pays w0 ≥ b choose to
work; those that ﬁnd a job that pays w0 <bchoose leisure instead. Thus, F(b) denotes
the fraction of job-searchers who are ‘unsuccessful’ in their search. Assuming that the
reference period for a labor force survey is the length of a period (and that the survey is
performed at the end of the period), the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by:
U = G(wR)F(b).
In other words, the unemployed are those who: (a) performed no work during the reference
period; and (b) were actively searching for work during the reference period.
3Associated with the ‘steady-state’ unemployment rate U are steady-state ﬂows of
workers making transitions from employment to unemployment (job destruction) and
transitions from unemployment to employment (job creation); these ﬂows are given by:
JC =[ 1 − G(wR)F(b)]U;
JD = G(wR)F(b)(1 − U).
Any given individual may, of course, experience a variety of employment/unemployment
histories.
T h em o d e ld e v e l o p e da b o v ec o n s t i t u t e sa ne x a m p l eo ft h em o d e r na p p r o a c ht ot h e
theory of unemployment. Note that unemployment here is interpreted as an equilibrium
phenomenon; in particular, it is not the product of irrational behavior or markets that
fail to clear. Instead, unemployment is the natural by-product of an economy subject to
ongoing structural disturbances that depreciate the value of existing employer-employee
matches, and where match formation takes time owing to the imperfect information per-
taining to the location of new job opportunities.
One by-product of the modern theory of unemployment is that renders obsolete much
of the traditional language that was used to describe the phenomenon; i.e., see Rogerson
(1997). Consider, for example, the traditional classiﬁcation of unemployment into its
‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ components. In the model developed above, there is a sense
in which unemployment is both voluntary and involuntary. It is voluntary in the sense
that the model people (as with real people) can choose not to search; and instead allocate
time to inferior job opportunities or home production activities. On the other hand, it
is also involuntary in the sense that the economic circumstances that compel individuals
to become unemployed are often beyond their control. By the same token, however, the
same classiﬁcation might be made for employed workers (e.g., the existence of those who
cannot aﬀord not to work, or the so-called working poor). Whether these traditional
labels have any substantive meaning, however, is questionable. In particular, note that
the well-being of these model people (and presumably, people in reality) does not depend
of how we (as theorists) choose to label them.
4W e l f a r e
A classic question in the theory of the labor market is whether an equilibrium level of
unemployment corresponds in any way to an eﬃcient allocation. Not surprisingly, the
answer to this question depends critically on the nature of the economic environment;
see Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Hosios (1990) and Moen (1997). In the present
















The socially optimal reservation wage is given by:
w∗




The optimal unemployment rate corresponds to the equilibrium unemployment rate if
w∗
R = wR, where wR is the solution to (1). As it turns out, this will be the case if u00 =0
4(risk-neutral individuals). However, with risk-averse individuals, one can easily establish
that wR <w ∗
R, which implies here that the equilibrium unemployment rate is too low.T h e
suboptimality of equilibrium in this particular model has nothing to do with search per
se; rather, it is due to the assumed lack of insurance. The intuition is straightforward: in
the absence of a well-functioning insurance market, individuals are too willing to hold on
to marginal jobs, rather than risk an even worse outcome in the event of an unsuccessful
job-search.
One striking implication of the modern theory of unemployment is that the unemploy-
ment rate bears no obvious relation to any sensible measure of social welfare. Consider,
for example, two economies A and B, identical in every respect except that bA >b B (so
that the residents of economy A are in some sense ‘wealthier’ than those of economy B).
In this case, the unemployment rate in economy A will be higher than in economy B.
Nevertheless, given the choice, individuals would rather live in the high-unemployment
economy. On the other hand, suppose that the two economies diﬀer only in terms of
F, with FA stochastically dominating FB. In this case, economy A will have lower un-
employment and higher welfare. The basic lesson here is that ‘economic performance’
should not be measured in terms of how individuals choose to allocate their time across
competing activities; but rather should be measured in terms of the level and distribution
(or stochastic properties) of broadly-deﬁned consumption.
5 Unemployment Insurance
Governments in many countries operate a ﬁscal policy known as unemployment insurance
(UI). UI systems are characterized by transfers of income to those who are unemployed (or
otherwise meet certain eligibility requirements) that are typically ﬁnanced via a payroll
tax (or out of general tax revenue). Presumably, the motivation for such transfers rests
on the belief that: [1] private insurance markets are unavailable (or work poorly); and [2]
self-insurance (via precautionary saving) is either grossly ineﬃcient, or perhaps beyond
the means of many workers (a more cynical view interprets UI as one of many government
transfer schemes designed to beneﬁt various special interests at the expense of the general
taxpayer).
Search models of unemployment have been applied in both positive and normative
investigations concerning the eﬀects of UI programs. For example, in the context of the
model developed above, let b denote a UI beneﬁtt h a ti sﬁnanced via a payroll tax τ. For




u((1 − τ)w0)dF(w0), (2)
which implicitly characterizes wR(b,τ). In equilibrium, the tax and beneﬁt level is related










For a given UI policy parameter (say, an exogenous level of b), equations (2) and (3) char-
acterize an equilibrium (ˆ wR,ˆ τ). The positive and normative implications of the theory can
then be deduced by varying the policy parameter b. Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) con-
sider a similar such experiment, albeit in a considerably richer environment that (among
other things) models the UI system in greater detail (in particular, UI programs are
5typically characterized by several program parameters, including eligibility requirements,
replacement rates, and beneﬁt duration parameters).
Several papers have recently examined the issue of how an optimal UI system should be
designed. This question becomes particularly interesting when one reasonably assumes
that workers have private information concerning the nature of their job opportunities
and/or the intensity with which they search. In a classic paper, Shavell and Weiss (1979)
demonstrate that an optimal UI program should ‘front load’ UI payments, with beneﬁt
levels declining monotonically over the unemployment spell. The high initial beneﬁt
level provides the desired insurance; while the declining beneﬁtp r o ﬁle mitigates adverse
incentive eﬀects by stimulating (unobserved) search intensity. Wang and Williamson
(1996) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) ﬂesh out other properties of optimal UI systems
in the context of dynamic moral hazard environments. Among other things, these authors
report that optimally designed programs can deliver potentially large welfare beneﬁts
relative to existing systems.
6 Business Cycles
Search models of unemployment have also been used to interpret various aspects of the
business cycle. Naturally, a key set of questions deal with the cyclical properties of
unemployment itself. However, researchers have also investigated the extent to which
‘search frictions’ in the labor market shape the pattern of the business cycle more generally;
i.e., see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996).
An empirical relationship that has drawn considerable attention in the literature is the
so-called Beveridge curve; i.e., the tendency for unemployment and vacancies to move in
opposite directions over the business cycle; e.g., see Blanchard and Diamond (1989). The
level of job vacancies, as measured by the help-wanted index, is highly volatile and tends
to lead unemployment over the cycle. A natural interpretation of these facts is that as job
opportunities become more plentiful, unemployed workers are able to ﬁnd jobs more easily,
with search frictions preventing instantaneous adjustment. Vacancies themselves can be
interpreted as the business sector equivalent of unemployed workers. Since ﬁnding suitable
workers is costly and time-consuming, and since employment relationships once formed
are durable, recruiting intensity constitutes a form of capital spending that presumably
reacts to actual and expected shocks in much the same way as other forms of capital
spending; e.g., see Howitt (1988).
A seminal paper in this area is Pissarides (1985), who appeals to the concept of an
aggregate matching technology to model (in a reduced-form manner) the outcome of un-
coordinated search in the labor market; see also, Pissarides (2000), and Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). According to this approach, match formation (job creation) is the prod-
uct of the aggregate search intensity of workers (unemployment) and ﬁrms (vacancies),
both of which serve as complementary inputs into an aggregate matching function; i.e.,
mt = M(vt,u t). Ignoring individual diﬀerences, m/v and m/u can be interpreted as the
probabilities that vacant jobs and unemployed workers contact each other. If M displays
constant returns to scale, then these probabilities depend only on the labor-market tight-
ness variable θ ≡ v/u. In particular, m/v = q(θ) and m/u = p(θ), where q(θ) ≡ M(θ,1)
and p(θ) ≡ M(1,θ
−1). Note that q0(θ) < 1 and p0(θ) > 1. In other words, ﬁrms ﬁnd it
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd workers in a tighter labor market; while the converse is true for
workers.
With a ﬁxed labor force L, the stock of employed workers at date t is given by L−ut.
6Again note that the stock of employment constitutes a form of capital. Employment-
capital depreciates over time as matches dissolve owing to idiosyncratic shocks that aﬀect
the viability of individual relationships. Let 0 <σ<1 denote the fraction of employment
relationships that are terminated at the end of each period. In this case, the job destruc-
tion ﬂow is given by σ(L − ut). For simplicity, assume that σ is exogenous. At the same
time, the stock of employment is replenished by the ﬂow of job creation, p(θt)ut, so that
the stock of unemployment evolves over time according to:
ut+1 = ut − σ(L − ut)+p(θt)ut. (4)
In a steady-state, the ﬂow of job creation just oﬀsets the ﬂow of job destruction, so that







Equations (4) and (5) relate the dynamics of the unemployment rate to the labor-
market tightness variable θ, as well as to parameters describing the structure of the
matching market. In the simple version considered here, the unemployed search pas-
sively (workers have one unit of time that they allocate either to work or search at zero
utility cost). Consequently, the equilibrium θt = vt/ut is determined entirely by vacancy
creation, which is endogenized as follows.
Assume that each ﬁrm has a single job that, together with a worker, produces yt > 0
units of output. Assume that yt follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with G(y0,y)=
Pr[yt+1 ≤ y0 | yt = y]. For simplicity, assume that match-quality is identical across all
ﬁrm-worker pairs and that wages are determined by an exogenous bargaining process that
divides output in some manner between ﬁrm and worker; i.e., let 0 <ξ<1 denote the
fraction of output that accrues to the ﬁrm (alternatively, one could model wage determi-
nation by imposing a Nash bargaining solution). Let J denote the capital value of a ﬁrm
currently matched with a worker; this value must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
J(y)=ξy + β(1 − σ)
Z
J(y0)G(dy0,y), (6)
where 0 <β<1 denotes a discount parameter. Implicit in this formulation is that the
value of the ﬁrm falls to zero in the event that the match is dissolved. Note that if match
productivity exhibits positive persistence, then
R
J(y0)G(dy0,y) is increasing in y. In other
words, a positive productivity shock (increase in y) is associated with information that
leads ﬁrms to revise upward their estimate of the returns to match formation.
Finally, consider the cost-beneﬁt analysis associated with vacancy creation. Assume
that creating (and maintaining) a vacancy entails the ﬂow cost κ>0, measured in units
of output. A vacant job potentially meets an unemployed worker with probability q(θ),
with the match producing a ﬂow of output beginning in the subsequent period. Let Q
denote the capital value of a vacant job; this value must satisfy the following Bellman
equation:







Assuming free-entry into vacancy creation, the level of v will expand as long as Q>0. But
note that for a ﬁxed level of unemployment u, any expansion in the number of vacancies
increases labor-market tightness θ and therefore reduces the success probability q(θ).
In equilibrium, θ adjusts to a point that renders further vacancy creation unproﬁtable;





The economic mechanism at work here can be described as follows. Consider a positive
productivity shock. Since the shock is persistent, the return to job creation (contempora-
neous recruiting activities that augment the future stock of employment) increases; see (6).
Naturally, in response to these bright prospects, ﬁrms increase their recruiting activities
and create new vacancies. However, as the competition for new workers intensiﬁes, the
probability of success falls to the point where further expansion becomes uneconomical;
see (8). On impact then, the eﬀect of the shock leaves current unemployment unchanged,
but increases the demand for labor (supply of vacancies). The dynamic eﬀects of the
shock can then be traced out by appealing to equation (4). In particular, note that since
the job-ﬁnding probability for workers p(θ) is increasing in θ, the eﬀect of the shock is to
lower the future rate of unemployment. These eﬀects continue to be propagated forward
in time through the search mechanism.
7C u r r e n t I s s u e s
Several authors have observed that the unemployment rate appears to exhibit a type of
cyclical asymmetry; rising sharply at the onset of a recession, but declining only slowly
over the course of a subsequent recovery; e.g., see Neftçi (1984) and Hussey (1992). In an
inﬂuential study, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) investigate U.S. manufacturing data and
report that job destruction appears to be signiﬁcantly more volatile than job creation over
the cycle. The natural conclusion that follows from this body of work is that recessions
are attributable to shocks that lead to brief, but sharp, increases in job losses followed by
relatively dampened, but prolonged, periods of job creation as the business sector slowly
rebuilds its employment-capital; see, for example, Hall (1995).
Shimer (2005a) has recently cast doubt on this ‘conventional’ view of the cycle. In his
detailed examination of CPS data, Shimer concludes that almost all of the cyclical variabil-
ity in the unemployment rate is attributable to ﬂuctuations in the job-ﬁnding probability
(and in particular, the job-ﬁnding rate associated with transitions from unemployment to
employment, rather than from nonemployment to employment). Surprisingly (relative to
received wisdom), the separation rate appears to be very nearly acyclical and relatively
stable. In addition to these patterns, Shimer reports a very high degree of correlation
between the job-ﬁnding probability and the vacancy-unemployment ratio.
Taken together, this new body of evidence suggests that, at least for the purpose of
understanding cyclical behavior, one may reasonably begin by organizing ideas around a
simple Pissarides-style search model along the lines described above; i.e., with a constant
labor force L, an exogenous separation probability σ, and a job-ﬁnding probability p(θ)
that varies with labor-market tightness. Whether a suitably calibrated version of this
model can account for observation, however, remains a topic of current debate; e.g., see
Shimer (2005b), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), Hall (2005) and Mortensen (2005), as
well as Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) for a nice summary.
Apart from cyclical phenomena, several outstanding issues remain unresolved in terms
of understanding secular and cross-country measures of labor market activity. At the fore-
front of these phenomena is the dramatic rise in European unemployment rates relative
to the U.S. over the last 35 years; e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), and Blanchard
8and Wolfers (2000). But unemployment is just one of the three major classiﬁcations of
time-allocation, along with employment and nonparticipation (the latter two of which
contain many more people than the former). Rogerson (2001) documents several in-
teresting facts concerning the cross-country diﬀerences and low-frequency movements
in employment-to-population ratios. Among other things, cross-country diﬀerences are
large and persistent over time, with considerable movement within the distribution of
employment-to-population ratios across countries. Furthermore, while employment and
unemployment closely mirror each other at business cycle frequencies, the same is not
true at lower frequencies. This latter observation suggests that the commonly-invoked
short-cut of abstracting from participation decisions for business cycle analysis may be
inappropriate when investigating the causes of secular movements and cross-country dif-
ferences in time-allocation.
On the theoretical front, several issues remain the subject of on-going research. Para-
mount among these include investigating the microeconomic foundations of the matching
technology and the process of wage-determination in decentralized markets. On these and
related matters, the interested reader may refer to Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005)—a
recent survey that contains 167 references while claiming to only ‘scratch the surface’ of
this interesting and rapidly expanding body of research.
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